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This paper expands the toolkit available to consider the effectiveness of urban climate responses by 
examining political effectiveness in the implementation of urban decarbonization initiatives. By focusing 
on the politics of implementation, this approach complements dominant approaches for assessing the 
effectiveness that emphasize greenhouse gas emission accounting. Drawing on case studies of urban 
building low carbon governance in Stockholm, London and San Francisco incorporating 40 expert 
interviews, the analysis provides insight into whether climate change mitigation measures are catalyzing 
political momentum that is untangling fossil fuels from institutions. It finds that urban decarbonization is 
gaining political momentum when it comes to new buildings, although with concerning implications for 
inequality and uneven development, but systemic change is limited since efforts to target existing 
buildings are stumbling over challenges. Two key insights are highlighted: 1) reframing the policy goal of 
urban climate mitigation to decarbonization productively refocuses attention on systemic change; 2) 
effective urban carbon governance is not only about providing instrumental tools, but it also involves 
triggering political dynamics that build momentum. Future urban decarbonization initiatives should 






    Urban carbon governance takes many forms and involves many players. Though local 
governments are playing a pivotal role, other actors such as citizens, business groups and 
international organizations are also intervening in urban systems to try to reduce urban 
greenhouse gas emissions (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). These 
urban climate change response activities are growing in scope and prominence. Given the 
diversity of the responses, evaluating success can be complicated. Nonetheless, a limited 
number of tools to measure success have gained popularity, especially greenhouse gas (GHG) 
accounting and GHG reduction targets (Bulkeley, Broto, & Edwards, 2012; Erickson & 
Morgenstern, 2017). However, these calculative approaches to evaluate progress in the 
implementation of decarbonization initiatives often overlook social and political considerations 
(Fuller, 2017; Rice, 2015), which can make decarbonization appear to be about solving a 
carbon math problem rather than engaging in a contested political process (van der Ven, 
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Bernstein, & Hoffmann, 2017). Despite their dominance in policy and research, GHG accounting 
approaches do not provide a complete understanding of effectiveness in the implementation of 
urban climate change responses. It is also important to develop more detailed understandings 
of how to embed decarbonization and how to implement politically effective urban climate 
change mitigation responses. 
 
This paper expands the toolkit available to consider the effectiveness of urban climate 
responses by examining political effectiveness in the implementation of urban decarbonization 
initiatives. This paper takes one approach to political effectiveness using a political dynamics of 
decarbonization framework (Bernstein and Hoffmann, 2018). Drawing on case studies of urban 
building low carbon governance in Stockholm, London and San Francisco, I evaluate whether 
climate change mitigation measures are catalyzing political momentum that is untangling fossil 
fuels from societal institutions. In particular, I examine whether urban decarbonization initiatives 
are building political momentum by scaling up and/or becoming more durable when supported 
by the political mechanisms of normalization, capacity building, and coalition building, and also 
whether they are catalyzing trajectories toward transformational decarbonization where systems 
generate zero use of carbon-based energy. This paper advances two main arguments. First, 
reframing the policy goal of urban climate mitigation to decarbonization productively refocuses 
attention on systemic change. Second, effective urban carbon governance is not only about 
providing instrumental tools, but it also involves triggering political dynamics that build 
momentum. 
 
         The paper proceeds in the following sections. In section 2, I review considerations of 
progress in the implementation of urban climate mitigation responses and argue that 
decarbonization offers a new starting place from which to consider political effectiveness in 
urban decarbonization implementation. Section 3 outlines the case studies and research 
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methods. I examine the ways in which political mechanisms are enabling decarbonization 
initiatives to expand and become more durable over time in the three case studies in Section 4. 
In section 5, I discuss the implications for the development political momentum towards 
decarbonization before concluding in Section 7. 
  
2. Effective urban carbon governance 
  
2.1 Considering progress in the implementation of urban decarbonization initiatives 
  
         Urban decarbonization will require multi-scalar low carbon transformations to urban 
material, political and institutional infrastructure systems (Bulkeley, Castán Broto, & Maassen, 
2011). Some climate change mitigation efforts in cities are now targeting a transformative scope 
of change (for example, see CNCA [2015]). Building-oriented decarbonization initiatives, which 
are the focus of this paper, target issues like energy efficiency, on-site renewable energy 
generation, and integrated energy demand reduction measures (Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 
2013). However, it is not clear what successful urban decarbonization will look like since urban 
responses to climate change span a wide breadth of targeted systems, instigating actors, and 
governance approaches (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; Emelianoff, 
2014; Peng & Bai, 2018). Research has shown what kinds of climate change policies are being 
implemented (Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013) and that there are an increasing number of urban 
climate initiatives (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013), but we do not know which initiatives are 
successfully addressing climate change since many decarbonization initiatives are experimental 
and uncertain in their impact (Hoffmann, 2011). Furthermore, the entrenchment of fossil fuels in 
society creates a policy inertia that makes it difficult to make systemic change (Unruh, 2002). 




Calculative approaches to GHG emission monitoring dominate in the evaluation of 
climate mitigation action effectiveness. Urban actors have frequently used GHG emission 
reduction targets (e.g. 20% lower GHGs by 2020 from 1990 levels) and other related indicators 
(e.g. 100% renewable energy by 2030) (Bulkeley, 2013). Progress toward these goals is 
measured through data-driven climate change mitigation tools like carbon footprints and 
greenhouse gas emission inventories (Hughes et al., 2019). Success is also being measured by 
adding up the proposed GHG impact of local decarbonization initiatives, which is the approach 
taken by “orchestration platforms” (van der Ven et al., 2017) run by transnational actors that 
seek to value the climate governance initiatives of non-state and subnational actors. Studies 
have also sought to consider effectiveness in urban climate governance by comparing 
outcomes to targets using best practices, indicators, policy representations or greenhouse gas 
reporting (Kennedy, Demoullin, & Mohareb, 2012; Reckien et al., 2014; Zimmerman & Faris, 
2011). However, there are common limitations to many of these tools meant to measure 
effectiveness of urban climate action.  
 
At times, the lack of political consideration of GHG accounting tools makes it difficult to 
consider social and political implications (Fuller, 2017; van der Ven et al., 2017). Not only are 
formal reporting systems centred on GHG accounting failing to comprehensively capture climate 
responses underway in cities (Robinson and Gore, 2015), but the contested nature of urban 
decarbonization is also occluded when carbon governance is reduced to GHG emission 
reduction units deployed through behaviour modification or technological substitution. These 
calculative approaches to evaluating progress “potentially [reduce] decarbonization to a problem 
of making the numbers add up” (van der Ven et al., 2017). To understand effective climate 
mitigation responses, we also need to examine the politics of implementation. 
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There are recognized barriers to local climate change action that make implementation 
far from a certain success. Barriers to implementation include a lack of prioritization of climate 
change responses by political leadership, emphasis on business friendly environment, lack of 
technical and institutional capacity, lack of financial resources, and lack of information about 
how to respond (Robinson & Gore, 2005; Romero-Lankao, 2012; Schreurs, 2008). The 
implementation of urban climate action is a process that depends on the politics of collaboration, 
contestation and negotiation (Rutherford, 2014; Silver, 2017; Edwards and Bulkeley, 2017). As 
the work of others has shown, the implementation of urban climate responses is influenced by 
political dynamics playing out through, for example, leadership and institutionalization in local 
government (Burch, 2010a), policy champions (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011), and processes 
of narration and ordering (McGuirk et al., 2016). The politics of implementation have a 
significant influence on how (and whether) urban climate action unfolds, but commonly used 
evaluation tools for urban decarbonization effectiveness are limited in their ability to provide 
insight into how political dynamics are shaping these outcomes. Therefore, I argue that the 
toolkit used to evaluate effectiveness can be productively expanded to include approaches that 
examine political effectiveness in the implementation of urban decarbonization. 
 
2.2 Evaluating political effectiveness using a political dynamics of decarbonization 
framework 
  
        Decarbonization offers a different starting place to consider the question of urban climate 
action effectiveness. Decarbonization is the reversal of the entrenchment of fossil-fuel energy 
systems. These systems have been produced by the co-evolution of technological and 
institutional systems in industrial economies or “carbon lock-in” (Unruh, 2000). Decarbonization 
requires the disruption of carbon lock-in through the transformation of societal institutions 
(Unruh, 2000, 2002). Within this framing of the problem, effective climate change mitigation 
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depends on overcoming carbon lock-in. Short-term actions can incrementally improve the 
greenhouse gas emission performance of a system (e.g. replacing coal with natural gas), but a 
decarbonization frame recognizes that this is only an incremental improvement that fails to 
reverse the entrenchment of fossil fuel interests. In this paper, I use urban carbon governance 
to mean the explicit effort to decarbonize the city (McGuirk, Bulkeley, & Dowling, 2014). 
 
         This paper uses a political dynamics of decarbonization framework to consider political 
effectiveness in the implementation of urban decarbonization initiatives (Bernstein and 
Hoffmann 2018). There are two reasons to use this framework. First, a focus on decarbonization 
requires an emphasis on the politics of triggering systemic change. Most analyses of 
decarbonization prioritize technological or economic dynamics, but “disrupting carbon lock-in is 
fundamentally a political activity because lock-in has significant political foundations: It rests on 
norms, institutions, capacities, and coalitions that support fossil energy dependent systems” 
(Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018). Second, the framework allows for forward theorizing and a 
method of analyzing the potential for transformation, which is important given this paper’s focus 
on nascent decarbonization initiatives. 
  
         Bernstein and Hoffmann (2018) argue that decarbonization will be driven by political 
decisions that enable technological and behavioural change and that decarbonization initiatives 
will change systems by contributing to the political mechanisms of normalization, capacity 
building, and coalition building. In particular, these mechanisms may allow decarbonization 
initiatives to scale up and become entrenched over time (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018). The 
political mechanisms of normalization, capacity building, and coalition building (see Table 1) are 
drawn from literature on the politics of systemic change (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018). Norm 
change is an influential source for shifts in public interest and what is understood to be ‘good’ 
governance (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Selin & Vandeveer, 2005). Capacity building alters the 
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means to act by providing support through funding, training, technology etc. (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2012). Coalition building is the development of economic and political support for 
decarbonization by altering incentives or harnessing market forces. Policies that incentivize 
renewable energy, for example, seek to create new coalitions of support for renewable energy 
by creating new groups of ‘winners’ (Bernstein & Hoffmann, 2018; Stokes & Warshaw, 2017). 
The three political mechanisms are considered separately in this framework for analytical 
purposes, but they frequently interact (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018).  
 
Table 1 Elaboration of political dynamics of decarbonization (adapted from Bernstein and 
Hoffmann, 2018)   
Political mechanisms of 
systemic change 
What does this look like in political terms for urban 
decarbonization? 
Norm change - Discursive shifts in what is held to be in the public interest, 
which affects public policies and political expectations 
- Entrepreneurs propose new ways of looking at the world and 
addressing problems such as climate change 
- Everyday practices can build-up and shift ideas about the 
appropriateness of climate action 
Coalition building - The development of coalitions of economic and political 
support for decarbonization 
- Coalition building takes place when actors who have an 
interest in climate action are empowered or new 
constituencies are created by altering (dis)incentives 
- Social movement building and using market forces are two 
ways this can take place 
Capacity building - Building capacity to take decarbonization action through 
material, institutional, or cognitive means 
- Capacity can be provided when initiatives provide it directly 
(e.g. grants) or can be developed through initiatives such as 
co-governance between public and private sector actors 
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- Decision-making processes or program implementation can 
be altered when decarbonization initiatives generate 
institutional capacity (e.g. within governments) 
  
 
 Decarbonization policies and practices can scale up or become entrenched when they 
are supported by these mechanisms. Scaling can take many different forms. Decarbonization 
initiatives can grow in scope (e.g. expand from energy retrofits for commercial buildings to also 
include residential buildings), but they can also enable a large ecosystem of complementary 
decarbonization initiatives (e.g. an energy efficiency financial incentive program that spurs 
capacity building programs and energy audit industry expansion) and inspire policy diffusion in 
new places (e.g. local green building standards adopted at the national level) (Bernstein and 
Hoffmann 2018). In conjunction, policy changes can become entrenched through path-
dependent processes. In considering how a policy becomes entrenched over time, it is 
important to consider any increases in the durability of changes (e.g. incorporated into 
legislation), the expansion of the populations the changes cover (e.g. new groups join the 
population originally targeted by the policy), increasing returns garnered by participants in the 
change, and increased costs for those that do not participate in the change (Levin, Cashore, 
Bernstein, & Auld, 2012). Initiatives that are scaling up or are becoming entrenched have the 
potential to contribute to transformative change (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018). These political 
dynamics can catalyze three possible trajectories for targeted systems: 1) reinforcement of 
carbon lock-in, 2) increased efficiency in carbonized systems or 3) “transformational  
decarbonization, a phase change whereby fossil energy (and/or other GHG generating  
processes) is not just lessened, but a new trajectory toward replacement or zero use of carbon-
based energy is generated” (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018). 
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In sum, I draw on this framework to argue that politically effective implementation of urban 
climate mitigation responses: 
1) Builds political momentum by scaling up and/or entrenching decarbonization initiatives 
through the support of the political mechanisms of normalization, capacity building, and 
coalition building, and; 
2) Create trajectories toward transformational decarbonization where systems generate 
zero use of carbon-based energy. 
 
After explaining the methods and case studies, I analyze the cases for the presence of 
normalization, coalition building and capacity building to examine the ways that these three 
political dynamics are enabling the scaling up and entrenchment of decarbonization initiatives, 
as well as the implications for decarbonization trajectories. 
  
3. Research methods 
  
         I chose Stockholm, London and San Francisco as case studies based on three criteria: 
international leadership in carbon governance, heterogeneity within that leadership group, and 
evidence of leadership in building decarbonization. Membership in the Carbon Neutral Cities 
Alliance (CNCA) met the first criterion, which is a transnational municipal climate governance 
network founded in 2014 by 17 local governments. As the members themselves describe, 
CNCA members are local governments adopting “the most aggressive GHG reduction targets 
undertaken by any cities across the globe” (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2015:p.ii). This 
group is important to study, despite geographic limitations emphasizing wealthy cities in North 
America and Europe (see table 2), since the members are self-identified pioneers of urban 
“deep decarbonization” (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2015) that are blazing a trail they intend 
others to follow. To meet the second criterion, I selected cities with maximum variety in terms of 
 10 
demographics, climate, urban form and institutional setting (e.g. regulatory strength of municipal 
government, alignment with national climate policies) within the scope allowed by the CNCA 
membership. Finally, I selected locations where climate response strategies including initiatives 
aimed at building energy efficiency and low carbon energy for buildings. Since I used buildings 
as an entry point into processes of urban decarbonization, this criterion was key. Note that there 
are many climate response strategies pursued by urban actors, although buildings are a popular 
target (Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; Kennedy, Ibrahim, & Hoornweg, 2014). I selected cases 
where there was evidence of carbon governance of buildings over at least a five year period, 
which I assumed was enough time for implementation to have occured. Key contextual 
information about the case studies (Stockholm, London and San Francisco) is summarized in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 2 Members of the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance (USDN, 2015)   
Berlin, Germany  Minneapolis MN, USA  Stockholm, Sweden  
Boston MA, USA  New York City NY, USA  Sydney, Australia  
Boulder CO, USA  Oslo, Norway  Vancouver, Canada  
Copenhagen, Denmark  Portland OR, USA  Washington DC, USA  
London, United Kingdom  San Francisco CA, USA  Yokohama, Japan  
Melbourne, Australia  Seattle WA, USA     
 
         Urban carbon governance is multi-level and involves action taken by a range of different 
stakeholders across local, national and global spheres (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). Actors and 
institutions are setting decarbonization targets at multiple policy scales – from municipal (e.g. 
the City of Stockholm’s goal to be fossil fuel free by 2040) to international (e.g. EU directives on 
zero net energy buildings) – and these targets all intersect at the urban scale when they are 
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implemented in buildings and energy. Therefore, this paper examines carbon governance 
affecting Stockholm, San Francisco, and London’s urban systems whether it is driven by a 
neighbourhood group, local government, state agency, national government, transnational 
network etc. The framework’s three political mechanisms (norm change, capacity building and 
coalition building) work in the same way at every level. 
 
         This study does not compare the case studies in order to find causal factors, select best 
practices, or to choose a winner. Instead, I draw on data from three urban contexts in an 
interpretive approach to theorization of urban decarbonization. During five-week field visits to 
each case study site in 2015-2016, I conducted interviews with representatives from the urban 
development industry (n=12), government (n=18), utilities (n=2), building owners (n=2) and non-
governmental organizations (n=6) who were involved in building and energy decarbonization 
over five week field visits to each case study. The interviews were transcribed and thematically 
coded. I also did a documentary analysis of about 50 relevant policy documents and reports 
(such as municipal government plans) and conducted 19 building tours and site visits, including 
in-depth and self-directed tours of buildings (single-family homes, commercial buildings etc.) as 
well as site visits to urban energy infrastructure and eco-districts. I interviewed a community of 
practitioners and policymakers striving to achieve decarbonization in their cities. This 
community’s effort to achieve decarbonization represents a political struggle against entrenched 
interests embodying pervasive carbon lock-in across social, institutional, technical and 
economic systems. However, this was an elite group of actors and it is important to note that the 
decarbonization initiatives referenced in this paper do not represent a consensus about the 
nature of climate governance.
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Table 3 Case study key context, targets, policies, and indicators of progress 
  Population Relevant Targets and Context Indicators of Progress Key Policies and Programs 
Stockholm  901,000 Fossil fuel free by 2030 for city operations and 2040 
for the whole city; Reduce per capita emissions to 
2.3 tons CO2eq/capita by 2020; Halve the energy 
use of the existing building stock by 2050 (from 
1995 levels) (City of Stockholm, 2016) 
EU direction to achieve near zero energy in new 
buildings by 2020 (Hermelink et al., 2013) 
Sweden’s goals are to reduce GHG emissions 40% 
from 1990 by 2020 and no net GHG emissions by 
the year 2050 
The Swedish Building Code requires a high degree of 
efficiency (Hermelink et al., 2013) 
The City of Stockholm owns about 20% of the 
buildings in the city  and 70% of the land area (City 
of Stockholm, 2012) 
District heating meets 80% of Stockholm heating 
needs, facilitated by a history of communal building 
ownership (Dzebo & Nykvist, 2017). 
Stockholm’s GHG emissions 
reduced approximately 56% 
between 1990-2016 (C40 
Cities, 2017) 
30% reduction (from 1995 levels) 
in energy use in existing 
building stock (City of 
Stockholm, 2016) 
Most city-wide GHG emission 
reductions to date have been 
achieved due to fuel switching 
to non-fossil fuels for district 
heating, such as biofuels and 
waste incineration 
Local government and agencies are 
required to reduce energy use by 
10% between 2016-2019 
New buildings on city-owned land 
required to meet a high energy 
efficiency standard (max 
55kWh/m2) 
Energy efficiency demonstration 
projects 
Solar photovoltaics installation, 
particularly on municipally owned 
buildings. 
Eco-districts Hammarby Sjöstad and 
Stockholm Royal Seaport, where 
new developments are required to 





860,000 100% renewables goal: by 2030, residential electricity 
is planned to come from renewable sources and 
80% of commercial electricity use is planned to 
come from renewable sources (City of San 
Francisco, 2013)  
California building code targets: new residential 
buildings to be Zero Net Energy by 2020, 
commercial buildings in 2030 
California Global Warming Solutions Act (2006): 
reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020  
In 2016, electricity customers in San Francisco began 
to be automatically transitioned to the municipally 
owned utility program CleanPowerSF, which sells 
customers electricity incorporating a higher 
percentage of renewable energy at the same cost 
San Francisco’s GHG emissions 
city-wide decreased 14.5% 
between 1990 and 2010 (San 
Francisco, 2013) 
7.9% reduction in energy use 
among commercial properties 
that regularly comply with the 
Benchmarking Ordinance (SF 
Environment, 2015)  
Increased renewable energy 
because of the California’s 
Renewables Portfolio Standard 
(San Francisco, 2013) 
San Francisco’s Green Building 
Code (since 2008), requiring 
energy efficient new and majorly 
retrofitted buildings linked to the 
LEED and GreenPoint Rated 
green building rating systems 
San Francisco’s Energy 
Benchmarking Ordinance for 
commercial buildings 
Renewable energy supply through 
CleanPowerSF 
Capacity building programs 
including Energy Upgrade and 
Energy Watch 
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as the electricity that they were previously sold from 





8.6 million The GLA acts as a regional government above the 33 
boroughs of London 
GHG reduction target of 60% (below 1990 levels) by 
2025 (Mayor of London, 2016) 
Zero carbon city by 2050 (Mayor of London, 2016) 
25% of the heat and power used in London to come 
from local decentralized systems by 2025 (City of 
London, 2015)  
UK Climate Change Act: reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 80% of 1990 levels by 2050 
Reduced coal combustion in the UK (reduced GHG 
emissions for electricity) 
EU directive to achieve near zero energy in new 
buildings by 2020 
UK Zero Carbon Homes target by 2016 (cancelled in 
2015) 
London’s GHG emissions 
decreased 16% between 1990 
and 2014 and per capita 
emissions estimated at 4.4 
tonnes in 2014  (Mayor of 
London, 2017) 
Average energy efficiency 
savings 30-40% above national 
building code requirements 
since 2007 on large urban 
developments (City of London, 
2015) 
Retrofits of 500,000 homes in 
London and 400 public sector 
buildings by 2014 (Mayor of 
London, 2015) 
RE:FIT and RE:NEW GLA energy 
efficiency programs 
Energy Company Obligations for 
energy efficiency 
The London Plan energy 
requirements for new large 
developments 
The London Green Fund 
Decentralized and renewable 
energy development is also 
pursued by the boroughs. For 
example, the borough of Merton 
requires new developments to 
provide 10% of its energy use from 
on-site renewable energy 
generation 
Renewable energy development is 
also being funded through 







4. Political processes catalyzing systemic change 
  
   In this section, I examine how the political dynamics of normalization, coalition building 
and capacity building are catalyzing the scaling up and entrenchment of decarbonization 




         Decarbonization is being entrenched into building standards through the support of 
changing norms about what constitutes ‘good’ urban development. In particular, ‘good’ is 
starting to align with ‘low carbon’ in some places due to new expectations about urban futures. 
Decarbonization targets set at multiple scales are creating expectations for the future that urban 
actors have found they could leverage. As one participant in the research explained, the 
broader policy context in the UK supported the more stringent low carbon building requirements 
enforced by the Greater London Authority (GLA): 
“…there was a separate parallel trajectory in [the UK] government 
called zero carbon buildings and zero carbon homes, so that 
provided us with an extra stick. We didn’t have [the requirement yet] 
because that was going to be enforced in the future, but we could 
point to the direction of travel and say well you’re going to have to 
get there anyway” (London energy consultant, interview, Oct 5 
2015). 
As this quote shows, the broader policy context in the UK influenced expectations about the 
future. Local government actors in the GLA leveraged these norms about urban development to 
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entrench decarbonization into the GLA’s urban development standards. A similar dynamic is 
taking place in California. The state has aspirational goals for zero net energy for new 
residential buildings by 2020 and new commercial buildings by 2030 (California Energy 
Commission, 2007). There is evidence of entrenchment since these goals are significantly 
influencing state building code standard revisions (San Francisco environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Apr 20 2016). Despite the fact that ZNE is “a goal without teeth”, 
“people want to move that direction so this goal helps drive it” (San Francisco environmental 
non-profit representative, interview, Apr 20 2016). The goal represents expectations about 
future building standards so that, even though nothing happens if the goal is not met, actors can 
leverage the associated norms about good urban development to entrench decarbonization into 
the building code. In addition, the normalization of energy efficient building standards at the 
state level has facilitated the adoption of even higher standards in San Francisco, particularly 
because energy requirements were already ingrained into the development industry (San 
Francisco consultant, interview, Apr 19 2016). This supports previous findings that policy signals 
from higher levels of government can enable (and impede) local action (Burch, 2010b), and 
identifies norm change as a key political dynamic at play. New urban development norms about 
the inevitability and desirability of low carbon buildings can catalyze the entrenchment of 
decarbonization into building standards. 
  
         Furthermore, normalization was also a key dynamic facilitating the move from voluntary 
to mandatory requirements for low carbon buildings and energy. In San Francisco, the local 
government first established a financial incentive program for solar PV installation in 2008 called 
GoSolarSF. They did not require solar to be installed through the local green building code 
because, as one former municipal employee explained, “we couldn’t get a mandate passed 
back then. We didn’t even try it because we knew it wouldn’t get passed. But…you do the 
incentive programs and that gives people the heads up that that’s the direction you’re heading in 
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and then, now they’re looking at the mandate” (San Francisco environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Apr 5 2016). In 2013, California started to require that new buildings 
be solar ready, which meant that developers had to leave roof space that is suitable for 
installing solar available. The development industry had gotten used this requirement by 2016 
when the City of San Francisco began to require that some new buildings install solar PV in that 
saved space (City of San Francisco environment department representative, interview, Apr 14 
2016) (while still maintaining the financial incentive program). Similarly in the UK, some building 
features made familiar to the building industry through voluntary adherence to the green building 
code BREEAM have been incorporated into the regulated building code (London environmental 
non-profit representative, interview, Sept 21 2015). Norm change can facilitate entrenchment of 
decarbonization by supporting the progression from voluntary incentives to mandatory 
requirements. 
  
         Cultural and professional norms affecting individuals were key factors enabling 
decarbonization activities to scale up. Decarbonization for buildings requires that designers, 
engineers and planners adopt some new practices. Given the reinforcement of norms by 
professional institutions, it can be difficult to enable broad changes to standards of practice. As 
a municipal government employee explained, “[Swedish planners] have a planning manual that 
comprises, maybe 1000 pages…we have to follow standards, we have to follow regulations, we 
have to follow procedures…As a planning architect, as you get forced into that manual, and 
bringing in new things is difficult” (City of Stockholm planning department representative, 
interview, Nov 5 2015). Clearly, changing norms can be challenging, but the integration of 
decarbonization into professional norms and institutions is particularly important. For instance, 
retrofit requires new practices to become accepted in the development sector: 
“…Even though a lot of this technology already exists, 
certain technologies are favoured by designers, certain 
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technologies are favoured by owners or developers… [and] 
contractors might not be familiar with a certain 
technology…Because it’s not enough to just say ‘Hey, it’s 
this great new thing that’s going to save you a lot of energy’. 
If people don’t know how to install it, don’t know how to 
maintain it, don’t perceive it to be as easy or easier to use, 
then they’re not going to put it in” (San Francisco consultant, 
interview, Apr 29 2016) 
As this quote demonstrates, scaling is facilitated by familiarly with new practices. In the case 
studies, broader shifts in professional norms were taking place and facilitating the scaling up of 
decarbonization initiatives. In Stockholm, a representative from the development industry 
described how good development used to mean meeting energy efficiency standards, but “it 
shifted in the early 2000s. If you didn’t beat the standard by 20% you weren’t really good” 
(Stockholm development industry representative, interview, Nov 23 2015). In the face of 
progressively rising energy efficiency standards, normal practice in the development sector can 
shift. Over time, norms may expand beyond particular professions to become a broader cultural 
norm connected to a place. In Stockholm, the cultural norm of pursuing transformation for 
decarbonization supported scaling: 
“We have been doing systematic [climate] work for a very 
long time. And we are doing things that you think, people 
ask, like you asked, why are the heating companies doing 
this? And it's a lot of things. And why is the public transport 
company putting a lot of biofuels in the buses? Because we 
want to do something that is good” (City of Stockholm 
environment department representative, interview, Nov 28 
2015) 
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Decarbonization becomes a broader cultural norm and new carbon governance initiatives build 
on this cultural dynamic. In San Francisco, after decades of climate and energy action, there is 
“an enlightened business community. Not on every single thing, but in general many of the large 
developers see the value of green building” (San Francisco environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Apr 5 2016). Plans to design a new downtown district energy system 
(which is a rarity in San Francisco) were met with support by developers. This response led one 
municipal employee to remark, “I think that was a San Francisco thing” that the developers said 
to themselves “This is not crazy, and actually, our tenants are probably going to love it” (City of 
San Francisco planning department representative, interview, Apr 14 2016). Decarbonization 
activities can be scaled up through shifts in professional norms that, over time, can build into 
broader cultural norms. 
  
4.2 Coalition building 
  
         Coalition building within the development sector supported the entrenchment of 
decarbonization into mandatory standards. In Stockholm, for instance, a downtown 
neighbourhood called the Royal Seaport is held to higher environmental standards than the rest 
of the city. The specific standards were developed through a dialogue between city employees 
and development sector representatives. One development sector consultant described the 
collaborative dynamic of the process: 
“We were part of that development in the beginning when it 
came to Royal Seaport where they invited all the developers, 
their architects, their consultants…to have an open forum 
discussing the goals, the visions. If this mission is twice as 
good, how is that going to happen? What does that mean? How 
can we break it down? What kind of energy goals do we 
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need?…The City of Stockholm was very generous, I think, in 
their cooperation with all the other actors. They really raised up 
their hand and invited everyone to participate. And I think that's 
one of the main success factors for Stockholm.” (Stockholm 
consultancy director, interview, Nov 9 2015) 
The development sector was brought to the table as a collaborator to provide feedback on what 
kinds of targets are achievable and to jointly develop institutional processes. In this way, the 
development of the eco-district became not just a way to implement low carbon buildings and 
energy infrastructure, but also a targeted coalition building process with industry. Similarly in the 
UK, a non-profit organization called the Zero Carbon Hub was established as a place for 
industry to discuss and inform implementation related to the policy target for all new homes to 
be zero carbon by 2016. The Hub drew together a broad cross section of the development 
industry to define ‘zero carbon’ and sort out what implementation would look like. As one 
employee reflected: 
“I think what we successfully did is we created a safe area of 
debate for the industry. So we had an overall steering group 
that had representatives from deep green through to 
commercial house builders and technical planning product 
manufacturers, building control, everybody in the middle” 
(London environmental non-profit representative, interview, Oct 
6 2015) 
Through Hub workshops, a coalition of support was built for the zero carbon homes target. 
There was significant outcry when a new UK government withdrew from the zero carbon homes 
target in 2015, but the coalition was not strong enough to prevent the cancellation. Finally, 
coalition building with the private sector was also important in San Francisco. Key green 
building policy initiatives started with formal public-private committees: “The energy 
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performance ordinance came out of a Task Force that was formed of private sector and public 
stakeholders looking at how to improve energy efficiency in the commercial building stock. So a 
lot of these things are policies that grow out of partnerships with the private sector” (San 
Francisco local public utility representative, interview, Apr 13 2016). Industry leaders who had 
credibility in the sector were chosen to participate and the resulting green building ordinance 
had wide support. The political support developed through targeted coalition building with 
industry can entrench decarbonization into building development standards. 
  
         Coalition building made decarbonization initiatives particularly ‘sticky’ or difficult to 
withdraw from by offering returns to participants. Industry that joined the coalition shaping the 
standards for the Stockholm Royal Seaport, for example, gained access to the premium urban 
land for development. More broadly, an industry association representative in Stockholm 
explained that “It's good business for our member companies but to build new energy efficient 
buildings because…you get paid a bit more” (Stockholm development industry representative, 
interview, Nov 24 2015). Green building becomes a premium offering for developers and a 
resource for reputation building: “For our own reputation, we’d far sooner have an increased 
share of the green marketplace than the brown. The green being sustainable buildings and 
brown being just the average” (London development industry representative, interview, Oct 1 
2015). When participation in the coalition brings returns, more actors seek to join the coalition 
and there is more support for entrenchment of decarbonization in development standards. 
However, concerns were also noted about building neighbourhoods from scratch: 
“…for example, the only people who can afford to live there is 
white, middle-class people who have a steady income. So, that’s 
a problem because if you build a completely new district, and the 
average rent or condo prices are really high, how does it look in 
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five years?” (Stockholm development industry representative, 
interview, Nov 23 2015) 
While the use of premium urban land may incentivize corporations to participate, it also 
increases the cost of decarbonized new buildings, which has equity implications. 
  
         Coalition building within local government and agencies also supported the 
entrenchment of decarbonization, but in different ways than coalition building in the private 
sector. Municipal governments are major players in urban development; The City of San 
Francisco, for example, is the biggest builder in the Bay Area. However, many municipal 
departments and agencies do not see environmental action as a key part of their mandate. To 
address this, some local government actors sought to entrench decarbonization priorities 
broadly across government operations using coalition building tactics. In San Francisco, the 
Environment Department used friendly competition between departments and recognition of 
progress in order to encourage departments to internalize GHG goals. They found that some 
departments started to take ownership of low carbon transformation by incorporating energy 
and GHG targets into internal reporting and job descriptions and by connecting climate and 
energy action to other priorities (City of San Francisco environment department representatives, 
interview, Apr 11 2016). As a specific example, the airport in San Francisco began going 
beyond the city’s green building requirements after seeing the impact of the airport’s first LEED 
Gold building and making the connection to opportunities for reputation enhancement (San 
Francisco development industry consultant, interview, Apr 19 2016). Relatedly, in Stockholm, 
municipal agencies report on decarbonization targets regularly as a part of regular operations 
linked to the budget cycle. This institutionalization of decarbonization makes it clearer which 
agencies were successfully meeting decarbonization targets - essentially identifying the 
frontrunners of urban decarbonization implementation within local government (City of 
Stockholm planning department representative, interview, Nov 5 2015). The tools one can use 
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to motivate support for decarbonization are clearly different across the public and private sector. 
Nonetheless, coalition building was a key dynamic allowing decarbonization to be entrenched 
broadly across local government, particularly using the tools of competition, recognition and 
institutionalization. 
  
4.3 Capacity building 
  
         In the case studies, urban actors used learning spaces to build capacity in ways that 
facilitated the scaling up of low carbon initiatives. For example, the Royal Seaport in Stockholm 
was described expressly as learning space to develop the capacity to deliver the most efficient 
buildings commercially possible. One municipal employee explained the capacity building role 
the Royal Seaport plays locally and internationally:  
“Many international delegations come…from universities, from 
cities, from companies and so on, who want to come here and 
see how we do it in Royal Seaport. And so it's both a window 
and for us a little bit of an experiment. To see what is possible 
to do” (City of Stockholm environment department 
representative, interview, Nov 10 2015). 
The experiences from the eco-district allowed industry to develop technical skills and low carbon 
supply chains and allowed the local governance to experiment with new governance practices. 
In this way, the learning process expanded the cutting edge of low carbon development. The 
quote also shows the way that the Royal Seaport has been a learning space for universities and 
other cities, which shows the ways that these experiences have been scaled up internationally. 
In London, new developments for the Olympics were required to meet a building standard called 
Code 4 in the Code for Sustainable Homes. As one representative of the development industry 
explained, “that was quite challenging for the industry to deliver, but now that it’s delivered, it 
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becomes - well why wouldn’t you do Code 4? Because you’ve got a supply chain with all of the 
skills and expertise to deliver that” (London development industry representative, interview, Oct 
1 2015). Capacity building across the supply chain creates opportunities for development 
companies to deliver lower carbon homes more broadly as normal practice. Finally, the whole 
city can function as a learning space that feeds in to state or nation-wide building standards. As 
one city of Stockholm employee explained, “We think that it’s important that the cities who really 
have a good market could be in the front improving [building [standards]” (City of Stockholm 
development office representative, interview, Nov 4 2015). It is now planned that the Swedish 
building code in 2021 will require the same energy efficiency standard that is already required 
for new buildings in Stockholm (London environmental non-profit representative, interview, Sept 
21 2015). Similarly, a participant in the research noted that the higher standards adopted by 
cities like San Francisco helped to broadly shift the market for urban development, which 
facilitated the adoption of higher state-wide standards (San Francisco environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Apr 20 2016). Whether capacity relates to low carbon technical skills, 
governance practices, or supply chains, urban learning spaces can build capacity that scales up 
the accomplishment of low carbon new development. 
  
         Green building certifications are also supporting capacity building in ways that enable 
the scaling up and entrenchment of low carbon practices. Green building certifications have 
created entry level space to facilitate the acceptance of green building practices for new 
development: “I think the green building certification thing that has been successful, whether 
you like BREEAM, LEED and whether it actually leads to a more sustainable building or not, it is 
something that people, developers and investors do understand.” (London development industry 
representative, interview, Oct 1 2015) If they understand certification, some groups begin to 
demand it for new developments. In Stockholm, commercial buildings that are not built to a 
certification (e.g. BREEAM or LEED) “would not be possible to rent out” since “tenants are very 
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demanding” and development financiers such as pension funds often require certification (City 
of Stockholm planning department representative, interview, Nov 5 2015). Of course, in terms of 
decarbonization outcomes for buildings, green certification systems “are rather weak 
sometimes” (City of Stockholm planning department representative, interview, Nov 5 2015) and 
“can be treated as a tick box exercise, but at least it ticks the boxes in terms of improving the 
performance in the design and construction phase of buildings” (London development industry 
representative, interview, Oct 1 2015). Nonetheless, the adherence to green certification 
standards can change what is considered accepted practice in building design, procurement 
and construction.  This can lead to scaling up so that green building practices are applied more 
broadly. In San Francisco, “LEED and energy star [are] being used really extremely 
widely…And the bulk of it remains voluntary use of those tools. So you have effective market 
transformation occurring out of those labels” (City of San Francisco environment department 
representative, interview, Apr 14 2016). Voluntary green certification fills a capacity building role 
for the private sector in ways that facilitate entrenchment: “BREEAM has helped the sector trial 
this new thing out in a safe space, and now they’ve moved on in terms of knowledge and supply 
chain is there, the product is there, materials etc. So now that could be a requirement and it 
wouldn’t have undue burden on the sector to achieve it” (London environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Sept 21 2015). Green certification can therefore support the 
development of green building capacity in the private sector, which makes it possible to 
increase related standards enforced through the building code. Nonetheless, this capacity may 
be limited in critical ways, since scholars have found that some applications of certification 
programs like LEED fail to reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions compared to non-
LEED buildings (Scofield, 2013). 
  
         Most of this section has dealt with new development. Existing buildings are also targeted 
by decarbonization initiatives, but only a limited number of initiatives are successfully scaling up 
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and becoming entrenched. Capacity building is a particularly important dynamic that is 
facilitating the expansion of some low carbon practices for building retrofits. Many of these 
capacity building initiatives have focused on technical capacity. In San Francisco, a municipal 
department has “a full service energy efficiency program focusing on largely government 
buildings” (San Francisco local public utility representative, Apr 13 2016) that is able to custom 
tailor energy retrofit proposals to public agencies that lack the financial incentives experienced 
in the private sector. Through two programs run by the GLA called RE:FIT and RE:NEW, GLA 
employees act as very low cost consultants to public and private building owners respectively to 
facilitate building energy efficiency retrofits. The programs have tried different models for 
incentivizing retrofits, but have found the most success through acting as consultants to provide 
energy services expertise to customers (Greater London Authority efficiency program 
representatives, interview, Sept 25 2015; Oct 2 2015). In addition to offering this technical 
capacity directly, local government programs are collecting or requiring the collection of key 
information. San Francisco developed a map of solar resource availability to facilitate 
investment in solar photovoltaic panels, for example, and the GLA developed a map of 
renewable heat sources to facilitate the development of district energy. San Francisco also 
requires large commercial buildings to collect and publish information about their building’s 
energy use, as well as conduct energy audits highlighting opportunities to save costs through 
energy efficiency retrofits. This technical information is intended to be a resource that enables 
decarbonization action to scale up. In addition, demonstration projects were important vehicles 
for capacity building related to energy retrofits for existing buildings. Multifamily residential 
apartment buildings were retrofitted in a Stockholm suburb called Jarva, for example, to achieve 
a 50% energy use reduction (City of Stockholm, 2015). Demonstration projects build the 
technical retrofit skills in the industry and act as an educational tool to show others that energy 
efficiency retrofits for these buildings are possible. Nonetheless, retrofitting residential rental 
buildings can also be controversial, particularly when buildings in low-income areas are 
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upgraded and rents increase as a result: “sometimes there can be fights about raising the rents 
and people are not very happy about having to move out” (Stockholm politician, interview, Nov 
27 2015). Overall, some scaling and entrenchment is taking place for technical capacity 
building. RE:FIT has scaled up from a pilot project for 14 municipal buildings and the model is 
now being expanded nationwide (Greater London Authority environment department 
representative, interview, Sept 8 2015). In addition, San Francisco “advanced the state in its 
thinking“ (San Francisco environmental non-profit representative, interview, Apr 19 2016) and 
building energy use benchmarking is now required for state buildings across California. 
  
         Financial capacity building often complements technical capacity building initiatives. 
Often, electricity and gas utilities are required to deliver a certain amount of energy efficiency 
and choose to do so partly by incentivizing residential energy efficiency retrofits (e.g. upgrading 
insulation). This is the case with energy companies in the UK. Although some wall and attic 
insulation has taken place in London due to special incentive programs, in general, energy 
companies have been disinclined to focus on residential buildings in London because so many 
of the homes have solid walls and insulation retrofits are cheaper for hollow walls. In California, 
a number of programs have sought to incentivize energy efficiency retrofits, which have often 
been administered through investor-owned utilities. Efficiency programs have targeted 
appliances, lighting, HVAC, industrial manufacturers and agriculture using tools like financial 
incentives, research and development, standards, and education and outreach (CPUC, 2016). 
Renewable energy generation, particularly solar photovoltaics, is also to be financially 
supported. For example, incentive programs from the City of San Francisco support solar PV 
installation. Up to 2013, $15.5 million USD had been provided to reduce the installation costs of 
PV systems for residents, businesses and community organizations, including additional 
incentives for identified ‘environmental justice’ neighbourhoods that have experience higher 
historical levels of pollution (San Francisco, 2013). Some financial capacity building takes the 
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form of loans. In San Francisco, PACE (Property Assessed Clean Energy) financing programs 
offers loans to homeowners to do energy efficiency retrofits and renewable energy installation. 
The idea behind the model was that “it made financing more accessible to a broader range of 
people and there were hopes that the PACE program would fill a very important gap of how are 
we going to pay for all of these upgrades” (City of San Francisco environment department 
representative, interview, Apr 12 2016). Though it originally faced challenges because key 
national mortgage lenders contested the way it operates, recently the program has started to 
expand. A similar UK loan program for home energy retrofits called the Green Deal had poor 
uptake due to design and implementation problems and was cancelled. The local governments 
in the case studies are also using various tools available to them to offer financial capacity. The 
City of Stockholm owns approximately 20% of residential buildings in the city through five public 
housing companies that rent apartments to a range of incomes. When the energy efficiency 
requirements housing companies had to meet were increased, they had access to large 
budgets for energy efficiency retrofits. After a few years when capacity had been built, efficiency 
upgrades were instead mainstreamed into budgeting (City of Stockholm environment 
department representative, interview, Nov 10 2015). In this way, energy efficiency retrofitting 
was entrenched into the operations of Stockholm’s housing companies. Financial capacity 
building helped local governments entrench and scale up decarbonization initiatives in other 
ways, including the use of local government buying power to spur innovation in low carbon 
buildings (“using [public spend] almost as trailblazers” [London environmental non-profit 
representative, interview, Oct 6 2015]) and the creation of market demand by mandating higher 
levels of energy and greenhouse gas performance for municipal buildings (London 
environmental non-profit representative, interview, Oct 6 2015). Technical and financial capacity 
building can scale up and entrench decarbonization initiatives, but experiences so far are 
fragmented and limited to only some sections of the existing built environment. 
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Table 4 Summary of evidence of political dynamics of decarbonization in Stockholm, 




Evidence from analysis of political dynamics supporting poltiical 
effectiveness in implementation 
Norm change - Norms drawing on discourses about the inevitability of 
decarbonization were reinforced by planners and NGO 
representatives to garner buy-in from others (e.g. developers) to 
support the implementation of decarbonization initiatives, including 
requiring low carbon and energy efficiency performance above and 
beyond regulated requirements 
- Voluntary action allowed developers to get used to requirements for 
low carbon buildings, allowing local governments to subsequently 
incorporate them into mandatory requirements 
- Changing professional practices (e.g. from good development meets 
standards in Stockholm, to good development beats energy 
efficiency standards by 20%) contributed to the development of 
broader cultural norms supportive of decarbonization 
Coalition building - Political support for decarbonization standards for new buildings 
was developed through targeted coalition building among industry 
and between government and industry 
- Decarbonization initiatives were made difficult to withdraw from by 
offering returns to participants (e.g. industry that joined the coalition 
shaping the standards for the Stockholm Royal Seaport gained 
access to the premium urban land), although this often meant 
premium urban land was the focus for decarbonization 
- Local government environment department employees catalyzed 
the integration of decarbonization into the mandates of other 
government departments and agencies using competition, 
recognition, and institutionalization processes 
Capacity building - Dedicated learning spaces in cities with higher decarbonization 
targets developed capacity that enabled decarbonization 
implementation through both technical means (e.g. research and 
 29 
development on cutting edge energy efficiency) and institutional 
means (e.g. new governance practices allowing for monitoring of 
performance throughout development) 
- Green building certifications built technical capacity in the private 
sector, which made it possible for governments to feel confident that 
they could increase related standards enforced through the building 
code (although certification programs are notably limited) 
- Governments have offered various programs to build financial 
capacity and technical capacity for residential and public sector 
building retrofits, but they have been limited in scope 
 
  
5. Discussion: Developing political momentum for urban decarbonization 
  
         Political momentum is under development related to new urban buildings. Norm change, 
new coalitions of support, and capacity building are all allowing decarbonization initiatives to 
scale up and become entrenched through implementation in ways that could catalyze systemic 
change. In particular, new norms about what constitutes ‘good’ urban development are under 
development providing some momentum. Furthermore, coalitions of support are being built that 
target powerful and influential players in urban development. Finally, capacity building is 
continuing to push forward the cutting edge for decarbonization in new developments. There are 
notable concerns as well, including coalitions structured to affirm inequitable outcomes through 
influential roles for corporate interests and the limited empowerment of citizen groups. This 
raises issues of unequal access to the decarbonized city, which was also a concern noted by 
some participants in the research. Who will be able to afford to live in low carbon developments 
if they are pursued as premium urban space? Who will be blamed for GHG emissions when the 
rich live in this premium space while the poor remain in inefficient housing? The findings show 
that political dynamics are creating momentum in the expansion and entrenchment of 
 30 
decarbonization initiatives for new urban development, which suggests that systemic change 
may continue to build over time towards decarbonized new urban development, but these 
concerns call the equity outcomes of this particular decarbonization pathway into question. 
  
         The development of political momentum enabling the implementation of decarbonization 
is more limited in the existing building sector. There has been success when it comes to 
capacity building and some initiatives that have sought to build technical and financial capacity 
have scaled up (e.g. GLA’s RE:FIT program replicated at the national scale) and become 
entrenched (e.g. requirements for municipally owned housing agencies to achieve energy 
efficiency targets in Stockholm). However, the scope of impact on the existing building sector 
has been limited, particularly if one considers the scope of the challenge. In order to achieve 
decarbonization by mid-century, existing buildings in developed countries would need to 
annually renovate a minimum of 2% to 3% of the total existing building to 50% lower energy use 
than the national average (Architecture 2030, 2014). While there has been success in retrofitting 
buildings under local government control, efforts to catalyze retrofits in the commercial or 
residential sector have encountered barriers. Even when residential energy efficiency programs 
have been broadly delivered by energy companies, the scope of retrofits has been limited since 
targets and incentives are incremental. This is not surprising since energy efficiency is narrowly 
conceptualized as a technological intervention abstracted from the social world and it is 
deployed in ways that actually reproduce resource intensive ways of life (Shove, 2017). As a 
result, the improvements tend to improve the efficiency of the system while failing to 
fundamentally overcome carbon lock-in. Capacity building is developing only limited pockets of 
political momentum for existing building decarbonization. 
  
         In light of this analysis, there are two key points that may support the development of 
political momentum to enable the implementation of decarbonization intiatives targeting existing 
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buildings in the future. Although norm change and coalition building were important for new 
buildings, there is limited evidence that these political dynamics are being harnessed when it 
comes to the existing built environment. Existing building decarbonization efforts may be more 
politically effective in implementation if proponents pay increased attention to changing norms 
and building political and economic support through coalitions. In addition, there is frequently a 
focus on the instrumental role for an initiative in terms of the solution if offers (i.e. providing 
information). Catalyzing building retrofit requires a broad ecosystem of policies and conditions 
(Jankel, 2015; The Carbon Trust, 2009). Barriers to implementing housing retrofit have been 
identified as “a lack of information on the true costs and benefits of retrofit, the perception 
among homeowners and their funders that the business case is weak, fragmented ownership 
structures, a lack of finance and access to capital, and a lack of a trained workforce” (Jankel, 
2015). As a result, there is often a focus on assembling bespoke policies and programs that 
instrumentally address missing components of capacity. This paper shows that politically 
effective implementation of decarbonization initiatives for existing buildings filled instrumental 
needs in addition to facilitating broader political dynamics. Therefore, decarbonization is not just 
about making sure the tools are at hand (e.g. information about building energy use, loans for 
energy upgrades), but it is also a process of triggering political dynamics that build momentum 
through the process of implementation. Future urban carbon governance of existing buildings 
should consider the complementary roles of instrumental solutions and political dynamics to 
develop political momentum for decarbonization implementation. 
  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
  
         This paper expands the toolkit available to consider progress towards decarbonization. 
To complement dominant approaches focused on accounting for GHG emissions, this paper 
evaluated political effectiveness in the implementation of decarbonization targeting urban 
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buildings and evaluated the implications for the development of political momentum toward 
systemic change. The findings showed that new urban development is often low carbon and is 
building political momentum in implementation through norm change, new coalitions of support, 
and capacity building. However, urban actors’ efforts to change the existing built environment 
have faced challenges and the development of political momentum within the existing buildings 
sector has been limited. Socially just decarbonization will depend on expanding successful 
implementation beyond new, elite urban developments. Overall, I have advanced two main 
arguments in this paper: 1) reframing the policy goal of urban climate mitigation to 
decarbonization productively refocuses attention on systemic change, and 2) effective urban 
carbon governance is not only about providing instrumental tools, but it also involves triggering 
political dynamics that build momentum. 
 
This paper also offers insights into how other urban actors can catalyze low carbon 
transformations beyond the case study cities. In particular, the findings show how political levers 
can be pressed to make change. The development of new norms about the inevitability or 
desirability of low carbon buildings helped urban actors to entrench decarbonization into 
standards for new buildings. Shifting professional norms was particularly important to facilitate 
the implementation of decarbonization initiatives. The political lever of coalition building can also 
be influential; practitioners have used tools like competition and recognition to entrench 
decarbonization priorities into the activities of agencies that have no clear climate change 
mandate. Urban actors in the case studies also found that decarbonization could be entrenched 
into mandatory standards for new developments through coalition building with the private 
sector that offered opportunities for deliberative participation and increasing returns. Finally, 
special decarbonization zones in cities for capacity building can help decarbonization initiatives 
to scale up through the development of technology, governance, and skills for both new and 
existing buildings. Urban practitioners should also note the concerns and limitations arising from 
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carbon governance so far. In particular, decarbonization in practice needs to find ways to 
pursue equitable decarbonization of buildings. Since carbon governance is finding success in 
decarbonization for new buildings in premium urban areas, unequal access to the decarbonized 
city is developing. 
  
         It is important to consider the limited geographic scope of this analysis to wealthy cities 
in the Global North when considering the transferability of the findings. While these cases offer 
insight into early attempts to pursue decarbonization, there can be many paths to 
transformation. Care should be taken when applying these insights and future work can build 
theorization from different places. In particular, more work needs to done on urban climate and 
energy transformations from the perspective of urban areas in the Global South. Other potential 
avenues of inquiry include responding to the critical need to better understand how to catalyze 
systemic change in the existing built environment and more deeply explore the issues of 
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